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Fixed Costs and the Division of Labor 
Haiwen Zhou 
Abstract 
 How market size and the level of coordination costs determine the degree of specialization 
is studied in an infinite horizon model with the amount of capital determined endogenously. Firms 
producing the same intermediate good engage in oligopolistic competition and choose the degree 
of specialization of their technologies to maximize profits. A more specialized technology is a 
technology with a lower marginal cost, but a higher fixed cost. Interestingly, the relationship 
between the level of coordination costs and a firm’s degree of specialization is ambiguous. A firm 
in a country with a larger market size, more patient citizens, or a higher amount of knowledge will 
choose more specialized technologies and this country will have a higher wage rate and a higher 
capital stock. If fixed costs decrease, firms will choose more flexible manufacturing.  
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1. Introduction 
To explain huge productivity differences among countries, Smith (1776) has argued that 
countries differ in their degrees of specializations in production and a country with a higher degree 
of the division of labor will enjoy a higher productivity. The adoption of machines plays an 
important role in affecting the division of labor (Smith, 1776, p. 11). Machines are capital and 
fixed costs of production. Stopford (2009) provides examples that higher degrees of specialization 
in production are associated with higher fixed costs and lower marginal costs: the transportation 
of some products requires specialized vessels such as oil tanks and liquified natural gas (LNG) 
carriers. Oil tanks and LNG carriers are fixed costs of production. While they are more expensive 
if compared with unspecialized vessels, they are more efficient in transporting oil and LNG and 
marginal costs are much lower. Large volumes of transportation make the adoption of specialized 
vessels profitable. Nowadays the service sector is the largest sector in developed economies. For 
some service sectors, higher physical capital reduces marginal cost of production. For example, 
compared with car transportation, high-speed trains require much higher fixed costs, but the 
marginal cost of transporting individuals among cities will be lower. Division of labor in the 
service economy is also frequently related to special skill training and high human capital 
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investment. Research and development activities also come with a high fixed cost and bring down 
the marginal cost of production.1  
As illustrated in Young (1928), when firms adopt more specialized technologies, it will be 
profitable only if firms produce extremely high levels of output. In a famous article, Young (1928, 
p. 530) argued the reason that productivity was higher in the US compared to the UK lied in 
differences in the adoption of more specialized technologies in the US and output difference led 
to this technology difference between the two countries: “It would be wasteful to make a hammer 
to drive a single nail: it would be better to use whatever awkward implement lies conveniently at 
hand. It would be wasteful to furnish a factory with an elaborate equipment of specially constructed 
jigs, gauges, lathes, drills, presses and conveyors to build a hundred automobiles; it would be better 
to rely mostly upon tools and machines of standard types, so as to make a relatively larger use of 
directly-applied and a relatively smaller use of indirectly-applied labor. Mr. Ford’s methods would 
be absurdly uneconomical if his output were very small, and would be unprofitable even if his 
output were what many other manufacturers of automobiles would call large.”  
With high levels of output necessary to recover high level of fixed costs, larger firms will 
have cost advantages over smaller firms and perfect competition will not prevail. For example, 
only a small number of firms can incur the research and development costs to produce LNG boats 
and the type of market structure for this market is oligopoly. With increasing returns in production, 
management, and distribution, oligopoly became a vital type of market structure for countries 
experienced the Second Industrial Revolution between the end of the 19th century and the start of 
the 20th century (Chandler, 1990). In their textbook, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005, p. 441) write 
that “oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure. Examples of oligopolistic industries include 
automobiles, steel, aluminum, petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and computers.” 
While Smith’s emphasis on the division of labor has received much attention, the 
interaction among fixed costs of production, high levels of output, and the degree of specialization 
has not received much attention in formal models of specialization.2 One exception is Rosen (1983) 
who emphasizes the increasing returns to utilization of human capital. Indivisibilities imply fixed 
elements of human capital investment that are independent of subsequent utilization. Thus, 
individuals have the incentives to specialize in one skill even though they are ex ante identical.  
 
1 The author thanks an anonymous referee for suggesting this broader interpretation of capital and fixed costs. 
2 Yang and Ng (1998) provide a survey of the literature on the division of labor. 
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In this paper, we study how different factors such as market size, knowledge, and 
coordination costs affect a firm’s degree of specialization in an infinite horizon model. This paper 
captures the role of machines in affecting specialization by specifying capital as fixed costs of 
production. Capital in this model should be interpreted broadly to include human capital, rather 
than restricted to physical capital. The amount of capital is endogenously determined by saving 
behavior of individuals. Individuals live forever and an individual’s effective supply of labor in 
each period is augmented by the amount of knowledge. While firms producing the final good 
engage in perfect competition, firms producing intermediate goods engage in oligopolistic 
competition and choose outputs to maximize profits.3  
In this model, firms producing intermediate goods choose the degree of specialization of 
their technologies. A more specialized technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal 
cost of production. This specification that a higher level of fixed costs is associated with a higher 
degree of specialization is consistent with Smith (1776, p. 11) that “labor is facilitated and abridged 
by the application of proper machinery”. Also, when an individual spends more time in acquiring 
more human capital by learning knowledges in given fields, this individual becomes more 
specialized. Thus, the degree of specialization of a worker increases with the level of human capital 
of this worker.  
The combination of the specification of capital as fixed costs of production and the choice 
of technology in this model is consistent with presentation on short run and long run cost curves 
in standard microeconomics textbooks. Suppose output is produced by machines (capital) and 
labor. In the short run, the number of machines is fixed and the number of workers is adjustable. 
Fixed costs are associated with the usage of machines. In the long run, a firm can choose the 
number of machines. When the number of machines used by a firm increases, variable costs in 
terms of labor costs decrease. That is, a higher fixed costs shown as a higher level of capital leads 
to a lower marginal cost of production.  
The modeling of specialization here is consistent with an alternative approach in which an 
increase in the degree of specialization is captured by an increase in the number of intermediate 
inputs used in producing a final good, as employed in Ethier (1982) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996). 
 
3 If firms engage in monopolistic competition and the elasticity of demand is constant, a firm’s output will be constant. 
In this model a firm’s optimal choice of specialization depends on its output level. This motivates the choice of 
oligopoly as the type of market structure because a firm’s output will change with fundamentals such as population 
size under oligopoly even with constant elasticity of demand. 
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In their models, when a higher number of intermediate inputs are used, marginal cost of production 
decreases. Since the production of each intermediate input requires fixed costs, an increase in the 
number of intermediate inputs indicates an increase in total fixed costs. Thus, their approach can 
also be interpreted as there is a tradeoff between fixed costs and marginal cost of production.  
Scholars have emphasized two factors affecting the degree of specialization: market size 
and coordination costs. First, for the importance of market size, Smith (1776) describes that the 
division of labor depends on the extent of the market, while the extent of the market itself depends 
on the division of labor.4 Kim (1989) presents a formal model in which a worker chooses the depth 
and breadth of her skills. A more specialized skill increases productivity of a worker but makes 
matching with a firm less likely. He demonstrates that a larger market size induces workers to 
choose more specialized human capital. Yang and Borland (1991) study a dynamic model in which 
an increase in the division of labor is captured by an increase in the proportion of output that is 
sold to other consumer-producers. With learning by doing, they prove that the range of goods 
produced by a consumer-producer decreases over time. Learning by doing in their model increases 
factor supply and can be interpreted as an increase in market size in essence. To formalize Smith’s 
insight, Zhou (2004) establishes the mutual dependence between the division of labor and the 
extent of the market in a general equilibrium model. There are some significant differences 
between this model and Zhou (2004). First, Zhou (2004) is a one-period model with labor as the 
only factor of production while this is an infinite horizon model with capital as an additional factor 
of production. Second, the impact of coordination costs on specialization is not addressed in Zhou 
(2004). 
Second, Becker and Murphy (1992) have stressed the importance of coordination costs 
rather than market size in affecting specialization. In their model, market size is measured by team 
size. They show that coordination costs and the accumulation of knowledge play important roles 
in determining the degree of specialization. Kikuchi, Nishimura, and Stachurski (2018) have 
studied a model in which coordination costs and transaction costs determine a firm’s level of 
specialization when firms engage in perfect competition.  
The tradeoff between fixed cost and marginal cost in this model is employed by Zhou 
(2019a, 2019b). Zhou (2019a) has addressed the impact of coordination costs and market size in 
affecting the degree of specialization of firms in a one-period general equilibrium model. There 
 
4 Stigler (1951) emphasizes that the division of labor is determined by the extent of the market. 
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are two important differences between this paper and Zhou (2019a). First, capital is not a factor of 
production in Zhou (2019a) while capital is a factor of production in this model and the amount of 
capital is endogenously determined. Second, the specifications of coordination costs are different. 
In Zhou (2019a), coordination is conducted by a hierarchy while in this model coordination costs 
are specified directly as a function of the degree of specialization, consistent with Becker and 
Murphy (1992). Zhou (2019b) has studied how resource abundance and market size affect a firm’s 
technology choice in which the amount of capital is endogenously determined. Like a specific-
factors model in international trade, labor, capital, and land are the three factors of production. 
While Zhou (2019b) is an overlapping generations model, this is an infinite horizon model which 
is convenient in addressing stability of the steady state. Also, the impact of knowledge and 
coordination costs on specialization is not considered in Zhou (2019b). 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the model. A representative 
consumer’s utility maximization, an intermediate good producer’s profit maximization, and 
market-clearing conditions are studied. Section 3 addresses the stability and properties of the 
steady state. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
Time is continuous and subscripts are used to denote time periods. Frequently subscripts 
may not be used if there is no confusion from doing this. There are two sectors of production: the 
sector producing the final good and the sector producing intermediate goods. Capital and labor are 
the two factors of production. The amount of capital in period 𝑡 is 𝐾௧. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that capital does not depreciate. The interest rate in period 𝑡 is 𝑟௧. The size of the population is 𝐿. 
Individuals live forever and the size of population does not change over time. Each individual 
supplies one unit of labor inelastically in a period. The amount of knowledge for this economy is 𝑧, which is assumed to be exogenously given. An increase in knowledge increases effective labor 
supply of an individual and each individual’s effective supply of labor in a period is 𝑧. The wage 
rate for each effective unit of labor is 𝑤௧. 
 
2.1. Utility maximization 
An individual’s discount rate is 𝜌 and her consumption of the final good is 𝑐௧. Her utility 
function is specified as 
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𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒ିఘ௧𝑙𝑛𝑐௧𝑑𝑡ஶ଴ .             (1) 
 The price of the final good is 𝑃௧. A consumer’s expenditure in a period is  𝐸௧ = 𝑃௧𝑐௧.                         (2) 
Individuals may own capital as assets. The amount of assets owned by an individual is 𝑎௧. 
An individual’s income in a period is the sum of income from owning assets 𝑟௧𝑎௧ and the wage 
income 𝑧𝑤௧. Let a dot over a variable denote its time derivative. The evolution of asset for an 
individual is 
    𝑎௧̇ = 𝑟௧𝑎௧ + 𝑧𝑤௧ − 𝐸௧.              (3) 
An individual takes the wage rate, the interest rate, and the price of the final good as given, 
and chooses expenditure over time to maximize (1), subject to the constraint (3). A consumer’s 
utility maximization yields the following familiar result: 
    ா೟̇ா೟ = 𝑟௧ − 𝜌.              (4) 
 The no-Ponzi-game condition is 
     lim௧→ஶ 𝑎௧𝑒ି ∫ ௥(௦)೟బ ௗ௦ ≥ 0. 
 
2.2. The final good sector 
Firms producing the final good engage in perfect competition. The final good is produced 
by combining intermediate goods without incurring additional costs. There is a continuum of 
intermediate goods indexed by a number 𝜛 ∈ [0, 1] .5  The final good can be used either for 
consumption or investment.  
If the amount of intermediate good 𝜛 used for producing the final good is 𝑞௧(𝜛), for a 
constant 𝜎 > 1, output of the final good 𝑄௧ is determined in the following way: 
   𝑄௧ = ቈ∫ 𝑞௧഑షభ഑ (𝜛)𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ ቉ ഑഑షభ.             (5) 
 
5 One advantage of this assumption of a continuum of intermediate goods is the elimination of an intermediate good 
producer’s potential market power in the labor market (Neary, 2016). While a firm has market power in the market of 
the intermediate good it produces because there is only a small number of firms producing each intermediate good, a 
firm does not have market power in the labor market because there is a continuum of firms demanding labor in the 
labor market. 
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 A firm producing the final good takes the prices of the final good and intermediate goods 
as given and chooses quantities of intermediate goods to maximize profit 𝑃 ቈ∫ 𝑞഑షభ഑ (𝜛)𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ ቉ ഑഑షభ −∫ 𝑝(𝜛)𝑞(𝜛)𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ . From a final good producer’s profit maximization, the elasticity of demand for 
an intermediate input is డ௤డ௣ ௣௤ = −𝜎.              (6) 
 The relationship between the price of the final good and prices of intermediate goods is 
given by 
     𝑃 = [∫ 𝑝(𝜛)ଵିఙ𝑑𝜛] భభష഑ଵ଴ .                             (7) 
 
2.3. Intermediate goods sector 
For an intermediate good to reach customs, coordination is needed. All intermediate goods 
are assumed to have the same costs of production and coordination. For each unit of output, 
coordination requires 𝜃𝑠(𝑛) units of labor, where 𝜃 is an exogenously given positive number and 
the function 𝑠(𝑛) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with 𝑠′(𝑛) > 0.6 That is, a 
higher level of specialization increases the level of coordination costs. Other things equal, an 
increase in 𝜃 means coordination cost is higher. Coordination of an intermediate good is conducted 
by the firm producing it. 
The number of identical firms producing intermediate good 𝜛  is 𝑚(𝜛) , and 𝑚 ∈ 𝑅ଵ . 
Firms producing the same intermediate good engage in Cournot competition. Like Zhou (2004, 
2009, 2011, 2013), to produce an intermediate good, there is a continuum of technologies indexed 
by 𝑛 ∈ 𝑅ା. A higher value of 𝑛 indicates a more specialized technology. For a positive constant 𝑏, the fixed costs in terms of capital used with technology 𝑛 is 𝑏𝑓(𝑛), while the marginal cost in 
terms of labor used is 𝛽(𝑛). When 𝑏 decreases, fixed costs are lower. We assume that functions 𝑓 
and 𝛽 are twice continuously differentiable, or 𝐶ଶ. To capture the substitution between capital and 
 
6 There are some alternative ways to model coordination costs. First, coordination can be performed by a separate 
sector like the transportation sector in Zhou (2014). In Zhou (2014), the transportation sector chooses technologies 
with different degrees of specialization. A more specialized technology in the manufacturing sector will induce the 
transportation sector to choose a more specialized technology, and vice versa. Second, the level of coordination costs 
can be specified as an exogenous parameter independent of the level of specialization. The results with exogenous 
coordination costs are similar to those here. 
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labor in production, we assume that fixed costs increase while marginal cost decreases with the 
level of technology: 𝑓′(𝑛) > 0 and 𝛽′(𝑛) < 0.7 One example of this tradeoff between fixed cost 
and marginal cost is as follows: container ports are more specialized than traditional ports. 
Compared with traditional terminals, container terminals can handle higher volumes of trade (more 
than twenty times higher) even though they are ten times costlier to build (Levinson, 2006). 
Another example is the grading of multiple-choice exams. Compared with hand-grading of exams, 
machine-grading requires fixed costs, but marginal cost is lower. To make a more specialized 
technology feasible, we also assume that 𝛽′(𝑛) + 𝜃𝑠′(𝑛) < 0. That is, when a firm chooses a more 
specialized technology, even though coordination costs increase, the sum of marginal cost and 
coordination costs decreases. 
Since the price charged by a firm producing intermediate good 𝜛 is 𝑝(𝜛) and this firm’s 
level of output is 𝑥(𝜛), its total revenue is 𝑝(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛). This firm’s cost has three components: 
fixed costs 𝑏𝑓𝑟, coordination costs 𝜃𝑠𝑥𝑤, and production costs 𝛽𝑥𝑤. Thus, this firm’s profit is 
   𝜋 = 𝑝(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛) − 𝑏𝑓(𝑛)𝑟 − [𝛽(𝑛) + 𝜃𝑠(𝑛)]𝑥𝑤.         (8) 
In each period, a firm producing an intermediate input takes the wage rate, the interest rate, 
and outputs and technologies of other firms as given and chooses its output and technology to 
maximize profit. This firm’s optimal choice of output yields  𝑝 ቀ1 + ௫௣ డ௣డ௫ቁ = (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑤.            (9) 
This firm’s optimal choice of technology yields the following first order condition with 
respect to 𝑛: 
   −𝑏𝑓′(𝑛)𝑟 − 𝑥[𝛽′(𝑛) + 𝜃𝑠 ′(𝑛)]𝑤 = 0.        (10) 
 Other things equal, equation (10) shows that a firm will choose a more specialized 
technology when its output is larger. This direct relationship between output and specialization is 
consistent with the argument in Young (1928). 
  
2.4. Market-clearing conditions 
 
7 To make sure that the second order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of technology is satisfied, it is also assumed 
that 𝑓′′(𝑛) ≥ 0 and 𝛽′′(𝑛) ≥ 0. Those assumptions mean that fixed costs increase with the level of technology at a 
nondecreasing rate and marginal cost decreases at a nonincreasing rate. Those second order conditions are used to 
sign comparative static studies. 
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 For the labor market, to produce intermediate good 𝜛, each of the 𝑚(𝜛) firms needs 𝛽(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛) units of labor for production and 𝜃𝑠𝑥  units of labor for coordination. Thus, total 
demand for labor from the production of intermediate good 𝜛 is 𝑚(𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑥. Integrating over 
intermediate goods, total demand for labor in a period is ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑥𝑑𝜛 . Total effective 
supply of labor in a period is 𝑧𝐿. The clearance of the labor market requires  
    ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑥𝑑𝜛 = 𝑧𝐿.          (11) 
 For the market for capital, each of the 𝑚(𝜛)  firms demands 𝑏𝑓(𝜛)  units of capital. 
Integrating over intermediate goods, total demand for capital in a period is ∫ 𝑚(𝜛)ଵ଴ 𝑏𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛. 
Total supply of capital is 𝐾௧. The clearance of the market for capital requires 
    ∫ 𝑚(𝜛)𝑏ଵ଴ 𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = 𝐾௧.           (12) 
Since the number of firms producing an intermediate good is a real number rather than 
restricted to be an integer, firms will enter until the level of profit is zero.8 The zero-profit condition 
for an intermediate good producer requires 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑏𝑓𝑟 − (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑥𝑤 = 0.         (13) 
 Demand for the final good is the sum of demand for consumption and demand for 
investment. Each of the 𝐿 individuals demand 𝑐௧ units of the final good for consumption and total 
demand of the final good for consumption is 𝐿𝑐௧. The amount of the final good used for investment 
is 𝐼௧. The supply of the final good in a period is 𝑄௧, which in equilibrium equals the sum of output 
of intermediate goods producers 𝑚௧𝑥௧ . The clearance of the market for an intermediate good 
requires 
     𝐿𝑐௧ + 𝐼௧ = 𝑄௧ = 𝑚௧𝑥௧.          (14) 
 Let 𝑥௜ denote the level of output of a representative intermediate producer 𝑖 and 𝑥ି௜ denote 
the sum of output of other intermediate good producers producing the same intermediate good: 𝑚௧𝑥௧ = 𝑥௜ + 𝑥ି௜. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, when an intermediate good producer chooses 
its output 𝑥௜, it takes output of other intermediate good producers 𝑥ି௜  as given. Differentiating 
equation (14) and combining the result with equation (6) yields9 
 
8 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Liu and Wang (2010) provide examples of models in which firms engage in 
Cournot competition with free entry. 
9 The derivation of the elasticity of demand for an intermediate good producer here is like Heijdra (1998, p. 666). One 
difference between his paper and this one is that in his model firms engage in monopolistic competition while firms 
engage in oligopolistic competition in this model. 
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   డ௫೔డ௣ = డ(௫೔ା௫ష೔)డ௣ = డொడ௣ = డொడ௣ ௣ொ ொ௣ = డ௤డ௣ ௣௤ ொ௣ = −𝜎 ொ௣.         (15) 
 From equations (14) and (15), డ௫೔డ௣ ௣௫೔ = −𝑚𝜎. Plugging the result into equation (9) yields 
   𝑝 ቀ1 − ଵ௠ఙቁ = (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑤.          (16) 
Equation (16) is the familiar condition that a firm’s price is a markup over its marginal cost 
of production and the markup factor depends on the number of firms in the industry and the 
elasticity of substitution among goods. 
Total capital stock is equal to the total amount of assets owned by individuals: 𝐾௧ = 𝐿𝑎௧. 
Timing both sides of equation (3) by 𝐿 yields 
    𝐾௧̇ = 𝑟௧𝐾௧ + 𝐿𝑧𝑤௧ − 𝐿𝐸௧.            (17) 
From equation (4), the interest rate equals the discount rate in the steady state: 
    𝑟 = 𝜌.              (18) 
In the steady state, the amount of capital does not change. From (14), the clearance of goods 
market requires  
    ∫ 𝑝 𝑚ଵ଴ 𝑥𝑑𝜛 = 𝑤𝑧𝐿 + 𝑟𝐾.          (19) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods have the same number of firms 
producing it, the same level of output, and the same price. Since the measure of intermediate goods 
is one and all intermediate goods are symmetric, for simplicity, we drop the integration operator 
in a symmetric equilibrium. For the rest of the paper, the price of an intermediate good is 
normalized to one: 𝑝 ≡ 1. Thus, from equation (7), 𝑃 = 1. 
In the steady state, for an initial amount of capital 𝐾଴, equations (10)-(13), (16), and (18)-
(19) form a system of seven equations defining a set of seven variables 𝑝, 𝑚, 𝑥, 𝑤, 𝑟, 𝐾, and 𝑛 as 
functions of exogenous parameters.  
 
3. The steady state 
In the steady state, variables do not change over time. We drop time subscripts for variables 
in the steady state. In this section, first we establish that the steady state is a saddle path. Second, 
we conduct comparative statics to explore the properties of the steady state. 
 
3.1. Stability of the steady state 
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With the price of a representative intermediate good normalized to one, 𝐸 = 𝑐. Plugging 
the value of 𝑥 from equation (11) and the value of 𝑤 from equation (9) in the steady state into 
equation (13) yields 𝑟 = ௕௙௭௅௄మఙ(ఉାఏ ). Plugging this interest rate into equations (4) and (17), the 
evolution of per capita consumption and capital stock is defined by the following system of two 
equations: 
   𝛬ଵ ≡ ?̇? = 𝑐 ቄ ௕௙௭௅௄మఙ(ఉାఏ௦) − 𝜌ቅ,         (20a) 
   𝛬ଶ ≡ ?̇? = ௅ఉାఏ௦ − 𝐿𝑐.          (20b) 
Plugging the value of 𝑥 from equation (13) into equation (10), the degree of specialization 
of a firm is defined implicitly by the following equation 
  −𝑓ᇱ𝑏(𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠) − (𝛽ᇱ + 𝜃𝑠ᇱ)(𝜎𝐾 − 𝑏𝑓) = 0.         (21) 
Let 𝑐̅  and 𝐾ഥ  denote the amount of consumption and capital stock in the steady state 
respectively. Linearizing equations (20a) and (20b) around the steady state yields 
   ቀ ?̇??̇?ቁ = ቌడ௸భడ௖   డ௸భడ௄  డ௸మడ௖   డ௸మడ௄ ቍ ቀ 𝑐 − 𝑐̅𝐾 − 𝐾ഥቁ.           (22) 
From (20a), డ௸భడ௖ = 0. From (20b), డ௸మడ௖ < 0. In general, we may not be able to determine the 
sign of డ௸భడ௄  because 𝑓(𝑛) and 𝛽(𝑛) depend on 𝐾 through equation (21). However, there are special 
cases that we can determine the sign of డ௸భడ௄ . (i) In the first case, suppose that the degree of 
specialization is exogenously given (𝑓, β, and 𝑠 do not depend on 𝑛). For the system of equations 
(20a) and (20b) with డ௸భడ௄ < 0, the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (22) is negative. With డ௸మడ௄ = 0, there is a positive characteristic root and a negative characteristic root. Thus, the steady 
state for the system of equations (20a) and (20b) is a saddle path. (ii) In the second case if the 
degree of specialization is endogenously chosen, for special fixed costs, marginal cost, and 
coordination costs, we can sign డ௸భడ௄ . One example is the following. Suppose fixed costs are 
specified as 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑛, marginal costs are specified as 𝛽(𝑛) = 1/𝑛, and coordination 
costs are specified as 𝑠(𝑛) = 1 . Plugging those specifications into equation (21) yields 𝑛 =ଵఏ ൫√1 + 𝜃𝜎𝐾 − 1൯. Plugging this value of 𝑛 into equations (20a) and (20b), the dynamics of the 
system is defined by 
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   𝛷ଵ ≡ ?̇? = 𝑐 ቄ ௅ఏ√ଵାఏఙ௄ − 𝜌ቅ,         (23a) 
   𝛷ଶ ≡ ?̇? = ௅ఏ ቀ1 − ଵ√ଵାఏఙ௄ቁ − 𝐿𝑐.        (23b) 
With డఃభడ௖ = 0, డఃమడ௖ < 0, and డఃభడ௄ < 0, the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the linearized 
system of (23a) and (23b) is negative. That is, when the degree of specialization is optimally 
chosen, for some kinds of fixed costs, marginal cost, and coordination costs, the steady state for 
equations (23a) and (23b) is also a saddle path. 
 
3.2. Properties of the steady state 
We now reduce the set of seven equations defining the steady state into the following 
system of three equations defining three variables 𝑛 , 𝑥 , and 𝑤  as functions of exogenous 
parameters so that it is more manageable:10 
   𝛤ଵ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ[1 − (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑤] − 𝑤(𝛽ᇱ + 𝜃𝑠ᇱ)𝑓 = 0,       (24a) 
   𝛤ଶ ≡ [1 − (𝛽 + 𝜃𝑠)𝑤]𝑥 − 𝑏𝜌𝑓 = 0,         (24b) 
   𝛤ଷ ≡ (𝛽 + 𝜃)𝑏𝜌𝑓 − 𝜎𝐿[1 − (𝛽 + 𝜃)𝑤]ଶ = 0.       (24c) 
 Total differentiating equations (24a) - (24c) with respect to 𝑛, 𝑥, 𝑤, 𝜌, 𝐿, 𝜎,  𝜃, 𝑏, and 𝑧 
yields11 
  ⎝⎜
⎛ డ௰భడ௡    0   డ௰భడ௪  0   డ௰మడ௫    డ௰మడ௪డ௰యడ௡    0   డ௰యడ௪ ⎠⎟
⎞ ൭𝑑𝑛𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑤൱ = − ⎝⎛
0డ௰మడఘడ௰యడఘ ⎠⎞ 𝑑𝜌 − ቌ
00డ௰యడ௅ ቍ 𝑑𝐿 − ቌ 00డ௰యడఙ ቍ 𝑑𝜎 
− ൮ 0డ௰మడ௕డ௰యడ௕ ൲ 𝑑𝑏 − ቌ
00డ௰యడ௭ ቍ 𝑑𝑧 − ⎝⎜
⎛డ௰భడఏడ௰మడఏడ௰యడఏ ⎠⎟
⎞ 𝑑𝜃.         (25) 
 
10 The derivation of equations (24a) - (24c) is as follows. First, equation (24a) comes from plugging the value of 𝑥 
from equation (11), the value of 𝑤 from equation (16), and the value of 𝑟 from equation (18) into equation (10). 
Second, equation (24b) comes from plugging the value of 𝑟 from equation (18) into equation (13). Third, equation 
(24c) comes from plugging the value of 𝑚 from equation (16) into equation (11) and replacing the value of 𝑥 by using 
(24b). 
11 Equation (26a) is used to show డ௰మడ௡ = 0. 
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Let 𝛥 denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (25). 
According to the correspondence principle (Samuelson, 1983, chap. 9), stability requires that 𝛥 <0. When 𝛥 is nonsingular, a unique steady state exists. 
Individuals differ in their degrees of patience. Psychological studies have shown that 
people with higher degree of patience are more successful (Duckworth, 2016). The following 
proposition studies the impact of a change in the discount rate on endogenous variables. 
 
Proposition 1: In the steady state, an increase in the discount rate leads to a lower capital 
stock and wage rate. Firms producing intermediate goods choose less specialized technologies. 
Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (25) yields 
   ௗ௡ௗఘ = డ௰భడ௪ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడఘ /𝛥 < 0, 
   ௗ௪ௗఘ = − డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడఘ /𝛥 < 0. 
Plugging the value of 𝑚 from equation (16) into equation (12) yields  𝐾 = ௕௙(௡)ఙ(ଵିఉ(௡)௪ିఏ௪).            (26) 
From equation (26), ௗ௄ௗఘ = ௗ௄ௗ௡ ௗ௡ௗఘ + ௗ௄ௗ௪ ௗ௪ௗఘ . Since ௗ௄ௗ௡ = 0 from equation (24a), ௗ௄ௗ௪ > 0, and ௗ௪ௗఘ < 0, it is clear that ௗ௄ௗఘ < 0. ∎ 
 
Proposition 1 shows that a country with more patient citizens will have a higher degree of 
specialization. It is intuitive that a country with more patient citizens will have a higher steady 
state capital stock because citizens care more about the future and are willing to save more. With 
more capital, firms producing intermediate goods choose more specialized technologies. 
Proposition 1 is consistent with the observation that the fast-growing economies in East Asia have 
high saving rates. 
A country’s market size is the product of population size and the wage rate (Smith, 1776, 
p. 23), which is endogenously determined in this model. Other things equal, an increase in 
population size means an increase in market size. The following proposition studies the impact of 
a change in population size on endogenous variables. 
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 Proposition 2: In the steady state, an increase in population size leads firms producing 
intermediate goods to choose more specialized technologies. The level of output, the equilibrium 
wage rate, and the amount of capital increase. 
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (25) yields 
    ௗ௡ௗ௅ = డ௰భడ௪ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௅ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௫ௗ௅ = డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௪ డ௰యడ௅ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௪ௗ௅ = − డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௅ /𝛥 > 0. 
From equation (26), ௗ௄ௗ௅ = ௗ௄ௗ௡ ௗ௡ௗ௅ + ௗ௄ௗ௪ ௗ௪ௗ௅ . Since ௗ௄ௗ௡ = 0, ௗ௄ௗ௪ > 0, and ௗ௪ௗ௅ > 0, it is clear that ௗ௄ௗ௅ > 0. ∎ 
 
 Proposition 2 shows that the result in Stigler (1951), Kim (1989), and Zhou (2004, 2019a) 
that an increase in market size induces firms to choose more specialized technologies is robust to 
this model with capital as a factor of production. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. 
Other things equal, an increase in population size means a higher level of output. A higher level 
of output makes the adoption of more specialized technologies profitable because the higher fixed 
costs can be spread over a higher level of output. A more specialized technology is associated with 
a lower average cost of production. Since firms producing intermediate inputs earn a profit of zero, 
a lower average cost shows up as a lower price charged by an intermediate good producer. With 
the price of an intermediate good normalized to one, a lower average cost means a higher real wage 
rate. 
For empirical research on the impact of market size on a firm’s degree of specialization, 
Garicano and Hubbard (2007) have shown that an increase in market size leads to an increase in 
the share of lawyers working in field-specialized firms. 
 When 𝜎 increases, the absolute value of the elasticity of substitution among intermediate 
goods is higher. The following proposition studies the impact of a change in the elasticity of 
demand among intermediate goods on endogenous variables. 
 
Proposition 3: In the steady state, an increase in the elasticity of substitution among 
intermediate goods leads intermediate goods producers to choose more specialized technologies. 
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While the level of output and the equilibrium wage rate increase, the impact on the capital stock 
is ambiguous. 
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (25) yields 
    ௗ௡ௗఙ = డ௰భడ௪ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడఙ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௫ௗఙ = డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௪ డ௰యడఙ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௪ௗఙ = − డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడఙ /𝛥 > 0. 
From equation (26), ௗ௄ௗఙ = ௗ௄ௗ௡ ௗ௡ௗఙ + ௗ௄ௗ௪ ௗ௪ௗఙ + డ௄డఙ. Since ௗ௄ௗ௡ = 0, ௗ௄ௗ௪ > 0, ௗ௪ௗఙ > 0, and డ௄డఙ < 0, 
the sign of ௗ௄ௗఙ is ambiguous. ∎ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. With a higher elasticity of demand among 
intermediate goods, a price decline will lead to a larger increase in demand for an intermediate 
good producer. A higher level of output makes the adoption of more specialized technologies 
profitable and tends to increase capital stock. However, from equation (26), an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods has a direct effect of reducing the capital stock 
through 𝜎. Since the two effects work in opposite directions, the overall impact of a change in the 
elasticity of demand on capital stock is ambiguous. 
In a modern society, knowledge accumulation is significant, and individuals are relatively 
specialized. An increase in knowledge can be captured by an increase in the parameter 𝑧. The 
following proposition studies the impact of an increase in knowledge. 
 
Proposition 4: In the steady state, an increase in the amount of knowledge leads firms 
producing intermediate goods to choose more specialized technologies. The level of output, the 
equilibrium wage rate, and capital stock increase.  
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (25) yields 
    ௗ௡ௗ௭ = డ௰భడ௪ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௭ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௫ௗ௭ = డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௪ డ௰యడ௭ /𝛥 > 0, 
    ௗ௪ௗ௭ = − డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௭ /𝛥 > 0.  
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From equation (26), ௗ௄ௗ௭ = ௗ௄ௗ௡ ௗ௡ௗ௭ + ௗ௄ௗ௪ ௗ௪ௗ௭ . Since ௗ௄ௗ௡ = 0, ௗ௄ௗ௪ > 0, and ௗ௪ௗ௭ > 0, it is clear that ௗ௄ௗ௭ > 0. ∎ 
 
Our result that a higher amount of knowledge leads to a higher level of specialization is 
consistent with Becker and Murphy (1992). One difference between their model and this one is 
that knowledge enters the benefit of division of labor directly in their model while knowledge 
augments factor of production in this model. 
Changes from mass production with specialized equipment and extremely large quantities 
of output to flexible manufacturing with small batches of output in some industries are discussed 
in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Eaton and Schmitt (1994). The following proposition shows 
that this kind of changes are rational when there is a decrease in the level of fixed costs. 
 
Proposition 5: In the steady state, a decrease in fixed costs leads to a higher capital stock 
and wage rate. Firms producing intermediate goods choose more specialized technologies. 
Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (25) yields 
   ௗ௡ௗ௕ = డ௰భడ௪ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௕ /𝛥 < 0, 
   ௗ௪ௗ௕ = − డ௰భడ௡ డ௰మడ௫ డ௰యడ௕ /𝛥 < 0. 
From equation (26), ௗ௄ௗ௕ = ௗ௄ௗ௡ ௗ௡ௗ௕ + ௗ௄ௗ௪ ௗ௪ௗ௕ . Since ௗ௄ௗ௡ = 0 from equation (24a), ௗ௄ௗ௪ > 0, and ௗ௪ௗ௕ < 0, it is clear that ௗ௄ௗ௕ < 0. ∎ 
 
Using the method in proving Propositions 1-5, it can be shown that the impact of a change 
in the level of coordination costs on an intermediate good producer’s degree of specialization and 
the wage rate is ambiguous. The reasoning is as follows. Equation (10) is the first order condition 
for a firm’s optimal choice of specialization. From this equation, 𝑓′𝑟 is the marginal cost from 
choosing a more advanced technology and −𝑥(𝛽′ + 𝜃𝑠 ′)𝑤  is the marginal benefit. With the 
interest rate equals the discount rate in the steady state, an increase in the level of coordination 
costs does not affect the marginal cost of specialization. However, an increase in the level of 
coordination costs affects marginal benefit directly through 𝜃 and through its influence on output 
and the wage rate indirectly because output and wage rate are functions of 𝜃. The direct effect is 
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that marginal benefit of specialization is lower. For the two indirect effects, first, from equation 
(16), other things equal, an increase in the level of coordination costs will increase the number of 
firms producing an intermediate good and a firm’s level of output. This tends to increase the degree 
of specialization of a firm. Second, an increase in the level of coordination costs can have an impact 
like a decrease in population size, leading to a lower wage rate. The latter effect tends to decrease 
the degree of specialization of an intermediate good producer. Without adding additional structure, 
it is not clear which indirect effect will dominate. This result that a change in coordination costs 
has an ambiguous effect on the degree of specialization is different from that in Becker and Murphy 
(1992). In their model, the type of market structure is perfect competition and an increase in 
coordination cost will increase the marginal cost of specialization. Thus, the first indirect effect is 
absent in their model and they show that a higher coordination costs leads to a lower degree of 
specialization. Even if we had specified that coordination costs would not change with the degree 
of specialization, with the ambiguous relationship between marginal benefit of specialization and 
coordination costs in our model, our result that the relationship between coordination costs and 
specialization is ambiguous will be robust. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied how market size and coordination costs affect a firm’s choice 
of specialization in an infinite horizon model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition 
and capital stock is endogenously determined by saving behavior of individuals. The model is 
tractable, and we have established the following analytical results for the steady state. First, the 
impact of an increase in coordination costs on a firm’s degree of specialization is ambiguous. 
Second, an increase in market size, the degree of patience of citizens, or the amount of knowledge 
increases a firm’s degree of specialization, the equilibrium wage rate, and the amount of capital in 
the steady state. Finally, firms will choose more flexible manufacturing when fixed costs of 
technologies decrease. 
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